The
Problem of Morality
What is
the source of morality!
Is morality
something imposed upon human beings by God, religion, society, or law? Is it
the result of reason, as some philosophers have argued? Or does morality arise
from something more fundamental within us?
To examine
this question, perhaps we should begin not with human beings, but with nature
itself.
Look at the planets, stars, mountains, rivers, and oceans. They exist, move, interact, and follow definite laws, but we do not ordinarily attribute sentiment or moral judgment to them. They feel no sympathy, compassion, or sense of right and wrong. A planet does not spare another planet out of compassion; a river does not decide that it ought not to destroy a settlement; a mountain does not feel responsible for the creatures living upon it.
They simply
exist and act according to their nature.
This may be
because what we ordinarily regard as inanimate nature lacks manifest
consciousness, or possesses consciousness only in a dormant or inaccessible
form. At this level, therefore, no apparent moral choice exists. There is
action, reaction, movement, transformation, and order—but no discernible moral
deliberation.
Now move a
step further, to plants.
Plants are
no longer quite as easy to place in the category of the wholly inert. They
respond to their environment, adapt to changing conditions, communicate through
complex biological mechanisms, and exhibit forms of sensitivity. Whether or not
these phenomena should be called consciousness or feeling in the human sense is
a separate question. What matters here is that life has appeared in a form more
responsive to its surroundings.
Yet we do
not normally find in plants anything resembling a conscious concept of right
and wrong.
A plant
grows toward light, sends roots toward water and nutrients, reproduces,
responds to injury, and reacts to its environment. These responses may be
extraordinarily complex, but they do not appear to involve moral deliberation. No
indication suggests that a plant asks whether an action is right or wrong.
There are simply impulses and responses—some beneficial, some harmful, some
neutral.
At this
stage, therefore, there is life and responsiveness, but no recognizable
morality.
From
instinct to order
Move further
upward, to animals and birds.
Here the
situation becomes more interesting.
Animals
possess a considerably more developed manifestation of consciousness. They
experience fear, attachment, aggression, pleasure, pain, affection,
territoriality, and many other states. They also exhibit remarkably complex
forms of social organization.
Some animals
live in groups governed by recognizable behavioral patterns. There are
hierarchies, territories, mating patterns, parental responsibilities,
cooperation, aggression, submission, and protection. Certain behaviors are
tolerated within a group while others are resisted.
“One could
therefore speak, cautiously, of a rudimentary social order, but not necessarily
of morality in the human sense.” But this is not morality in the fully
reflective human sense. “It is primarily instinctive order.”
An animal
does not normally construct a universal ethical principle and then decide to
follow it. Its behavior is largely governed by instinct, biological
disposition, learning, and the conditions of its particular social group.
The
distinction becomes clearer when we observe that different species follow
entirely different patterns.
Promiscuity
may be natural in one species, while pair bonding or long-term monogamy may
characterize another. Territorial aggression may be essential to one species
and largely absent in another. A behavior that seems unacceptable to humans may
be perfectly natural in another species.
If morality
were simply identical with a particular behavior, nature would present us with
an enormous contradiction. The same behavior could be "right" for one
species and "wrong" for another.
This
suggests that what we observe at the animal level is not yet morality in its
fully developed sense. It is primarily instinctive order.
An animal
generally does not ask whether its instinct is morally justified. It acts
according to its nature.
There is
another important limitation. Even where animals exhibit cooperation or care,
such behavior is generally directed toward members of their own species, group,
offspring, mate, or immediate social unit. No universal moral principle is
evident, comparable to the human idea that one ought to care for any conscious
being merely because it is conscious.
Thus, as
consciousness becomes more manifest, behavior becomes increasingly complex; but
morality, as we understand it, has not yet fully appeared.
The
emergence of the human moral question
With the
human being, something fundamentally different appears.
Human beings
do not merely experience impulses; they can become aware of those impulses.
They can observe themselves, question their desires, restrain an action,
imagine its consequences, compare alternatives, and ask whether something ought
to be done.
This
introduces an entirely new dimension.
The human
being can ask: Should I do this?
Not merely: Can
I do this?
And not
merely: Do I want to do this?
The
distinction is crucial.
A hungry
animal may take food because hunger impels it. A human being may also feel
hunger, yet decide not to take food that belongs to another person. He may even
sacrifice his own food for someone else.
The
biological impulse remains, but another faculty has appeared—the capacity to
observe, evaluate, and regulate the impulse.
This is
where the problem of morality truly begins.
Morality is
not merely the distinction between what is beneficial and harmful; it involves
consciously recognizing what ought or ought not to be done.
Consciousness
and morality
I believe
morality is directly related to the level at which consciousness manifests in
an individual. By consciousness, I mean that through which one's own existence
is experienced.
Here,
however, a distinction is necessary.
I do not
mean that consciousness itself becomes more or less complete. If consciousness
is fundamental, then its essential nature cannot become greater or smaller.
What changes is the degree to which consciousness is manifested through the
individual.
A simple
analogy may help.
Light itself
does not become more or less light merely because it passes through different
media. What changes is the extent to which that light is revealed.
Similarly,
consciousness may be regarded as inherently complete, while its manifestation
through different forms of existence varies enormously.
At one
level, it may remain almost entirely unmanifest.
At another,
it may appear as the responsiveness of living organisms.
At a higher
level, it may manifest as sensation, instinct, memory, attachment, and social
behavior.
And in human
beings, it may manifest as self-awareness, thought, reflection, discrimination,
imagination, and the capacity to examine one's own conduct.
This may
explain the enormous variation in human morality.
Every human
being possesses consciousness, yet consciousness does not manifest with the
same degree of clarity in everyone.
One person
may be dominated almost entirely by immediate desires and impulses. Another may
possess some ability to restrain those impulses. A third may develop
considerable sensitivity toward others. Yet another may reach a state in which
the distinction between self-interest and others' interests becomes
increasingly difficult to maintain.
The external
behavior may therefore differ because the internal manifestation of
consciousness differs.
Why are
some people moral and others not?
If morality
were entirely imposed from outside, we would expect people to behave morally
whenever the external authority was sufficiently strong.
But this
does not happen.
People obey
laws when they fear punishment and violate them when they believe they can
escape it. People may perform religious rituals while simultaneously behaving
dishonestly. They may speak about morality publicly and disregard it privately.
Conversely,
some people behave honestly even when no one is watching.
What
accounts for this difference?
Education,
fear of punishment, and religious belief cannot always explain the difference.
People
differ in disposition, sensitivity, intelligence, awareness, and temperament.
Development therefore takes place within certain limits and through different
stages.
This may
also explain why morality cannot simply be taught as a list of rules.
A person may
memorize hundreds of moral commandments and still remain fundamentally immoral.
Another person may know very few formal commandments and yet behave with
extraordinary honesty, compassion, and restraint.
The
important difference may lie not in the number of rules known, but in the level
of consciousness from which one acts.
Does
morality require God?
This brings
us to one of the oldest questions.
Must a
person believe in God in order to be moral? I do not think so.
A person
does not need a concept of God to understand that another human being can
suffer, that dishonesty can cause harm, or that unnecessary cruelty is
undesirable. Moral awareness can arise from consciousness itself—from
sensitivity, understanding, empathy, discrimination, and the capacity to
recognize the consequences of one's actions.
But human
beings do not possess the same level of understanding or the same capacity for
inner development. Some children are naturally bright and learn rapidly with
little instruction. Others require considerable guidance and a good teacher
before they acquire the same understanding. Education can develop both, but it
does not begin with an identical capacity in every individual.
The same may
be true of moral understanding.
Some people
may have enough awareness to recognize right and wrong without an external
authority. Others may need rules, social pressure, religious instruction, or
the idea of a higher power to guide and restrain them. This does not
necessarily mean that morality itself originates in God. It may simply mean
that different levels of consciousness require different means of expressing or
supporting morality.
This may
help explain the practical importance of the concept of God.
I have
sometimes seen disputes over financial transactions in my own village taken to
a temple for resolution. People who might argue endlessly elsewhere sometimes
hesitate to lie in the presence of the deity. This does not mean that everyone
becomes truthful before God. Some dishonest people will lie even while invoking
God's name.
But that
does not invalidate the belief's practical value.
If the
thought of God makes a person speak the truth when otherwise he might have
lied, then the belief has served a moral function.
For some
people, therefore, the idea of God may provide an external reference point that
restrains impulses and cultivates ethical conduct. For others, morality may
arise without any belief in God.
Therefore,
the absence of belief in God does not necessarily imply the absence of
morality. Nor does belief in God guarantee it.
The
distinction is important: God may be useful for morality without being the
source of morality.
Morality
beyond fear and reward
Morality can
also be deeper.
A person may
tell the truth because he fears divine punishment.
Another may
tell the truth because he expects divine reward.
A third may
tell the truth because society demands it.
But a fourth
possibility exists: a person may tell the truth because, at his level of
consciousness, truthfulness has ceased to be an externally imposed rule.
He simply
cannot comfortably act otherwise.
This is a
fundamentally different kind of morality.
The
distinction is between obedience to morality and its natural expression.
At a lower
level, morality may require rules, punishment, reward, social pressure, or
religious authority.
At a higher
level, moral conduct may become spontaneous.
A person
with a sufficiently developed consciousness may not refrain from harming
another because a scripture threatens punishment. He may refrain because another's
suffering is no longer psychologically separate from his own concern.
At this
point, morality becomes less a command and more a natural expression of
awareness.
In my view,
this is why morality is related to consciousness.
Morality
and the idea of human dignity
Western
moral philosophy has also explored morality through reason and autonomy.
Kant, for
example, located morality in rational autonomy—the capacity of a rational being
to give itself moral law rather than merely obey an external authority.
This is an
important philosophical development, but I do not think that morality
ultimately requires the concept of human dignity or autonomous moral
legislation.
A person can
certainly construct a rational ethical system. But the deeper question remains:
Why does
he possess the capacity to recognize moral value in the first place?
My answer is
that morality ultimately rests upon consciousness.
Reason can
formulate moral principles. Society can codify them. Religion can sanctify
them. Law can enforce them. Philosophy can analyze them.
But none of
these necessarily creates the underlying capacity for moral awareness.
They may
refine, organize, or regulate something more fundamental.
That
fundamental element is consciousness itself.
Can
consciousness be developed?
If morality
is connected with the manifestation of consciousness, another question
naturally follows:
Can that
manifestation be enhanced?
I believe it
can.
Human beings
have always developed methods intended to alter and refine consciousness. Among
them, Yogic practices occupy a distinctive place.
Yoga, in its
deeper sense, is not merely physical exercise. Various yogic disciplines are
intended to regulate the body, senses, breath, mind, attention, and ultimately
consciousness itself.
If these
practices genuinely produce a higher degree of awareness, their effect should
not be merely a collection of unusual experiences. One would expect some
corresponding transformation in conduct—greater clarity, restraint, equanimity,
sensitivity, and freedom from compulsive impulses.
This is an
important distinction.
An
extraordinary experience is not necessarily evidence of spiritual development.
A person may
experience visions, sounds, unusual bodily sensations, or altered states of
awareness and yet remain governed by anger, greed, vanity, jealousy, or
ambition.
If
consciousness has genuinely developed, its consequences should eventually show
in how a person lives.
Prayer can
serve a similar function, although through a different route.
Prayer
usually presupposes a deity or higher power. Yoga, in many of its forms, does
not necessarily require such a belief.
Prayer may
cultivate humility, surrender, trust, gratitude, or restraint by placing the
individual before something perceived as greater than himself.
Thus, both
prayer and yogic practice may help develop or refine consciousness, although
their underlying assumptions differ.
The
problem of God
Yet this raises
an apparent paradox.
If morality
can exist without God, and if consciousness itself may be sufficient to account
for moral awareness, what role does God have?
Here I would
distinguish between God as a philosophical reality and God as a
practical concept.
We cannot
conclusively demonstrate God's existence in the ordinary empirical sense.
But neither
can we simply deny His existence.
The
difficulty is inherent in the very nature of the question.
If the
Supreme is truly beyond all limitations, then every attempt to define or
demonstrate Him necessarily reduces Him to something the human mind can grasp.
We call Him anirvarchaniya—that
which cannot be adequately expressed or described. Yet even saying that He
"is" already introduces a description.
We have made
a statement about something that, by definition, lies beyond complete
statement.
This is not
merely a linguistic difficulty. It points to a deeper philosophical problem:
the human mind cannot step outside its own limitations to objectively
comprehend the Absolute.
Whatever we
conceive is necessarily conceived through our own categories of thought.
Therefore,
to "prove" the Supreme as one proves an ordinary object may itself be
a contradiction. The Supreme, if truly Supreme, cannot become an object among
other objects waiting to be demonstrated.
This does
not establish that God exists.
It
establishes only that the question cannot be settled simply by demanding the
kind of proof appropriate to ordinary objects of experience.
I believe
that to receive something good, one must become good. I also find reincarnation
logically plausible and accept it as true. In my view, we inevitably reap the
fruits of our actions: what we put into the world eventually returns to us in
some form. I do not regard this as a mechanism directly dependent upon God. It
may instead be a cosmic law, or perhaps even partly a psychological process
through which we create the circumstances in which we experience the
consequences of our past actions.
Our
subconscious mind is shaped by what we repeatedly think, desire, and do. It
may, in turn, influence our choices in ways of which we are not fully
conscious, gradually leading us toward circumstances in which we encounter the
consequences of our own actions. In this sense, karma need not require an
external judge who rewards or punishes us. The consequences may arise from the
very structure of consciousness and the patterns we create within it.
At its
deepest level, I believe, consciousness is fundamentally moral.
Science
cannot presently prove reincarnation, and I am not presenting reincarnation as
an argument for morality. It is a personal philosophical conviction that I find
consistent with my understanding of consciousness and experience.
My own
experience has also led me to believe that morality can develop through a
gradual process of trial and error. Our intellect learns from the consequences
of past actions and uses that knowledge to make future decisions, while the
subconscious mind may gradually steer us toward more constructive, less
destructive patterns. Part of this process may be natural, but conscious effort
can also strengthen it.
I have
noticed certain patterns in my own life that have contributed to this
conviction. I recognize what I might call my “good times” quite clearly.
Whenever someone in need asks me for help, and I can provide it, that period
often feels auspicious to me, and the other decisions I make during that time
seem to work out well. For example, I have repeatedly noticed that when someone
asks me for a lift while I am riding my bike, my own journey feels somehow
fulfilled, and I tend to receive a favorable response during the trip.
Over the
course of my life, I have also experienced periods of both legitimate and
illicit desire. These experiences were never motivated by the pursuit of wealth
or prestige. Yet I have found that periods dominated by illicit desire were
detrimental not only to me but also to people who cared about me. Such
experiences have taught me something that moral instruction alone could not:
actions do not merely produce external consequences; they also shape the person
who performs them. In time, we become, at least partly, the product of what we
repeatedly choose.
The
practical usefulness of God
Nevertheless,
a concept need not be metaphysically demonstrable to have practical
significance.
The idea of
God can provide a person with an internal reference point.
It can
restrain an impulse, encourage truthfulness, provide consolation, inspire
self-discipline, or remind a person that his actions have significance beyond
immediate self-interest.
For some
people, this may be indispensable.
For others,
it may be unnecessary.
The danger
begins when a personal spiritual conception becomes an institutional authority
and then claims exclusive ownership of truth.
Once a
particular conception of God becomes an organized system of belief, it can
become a source not merely of morality but also of identity, authority,
division, and conflict.
A belief
that was originally intended to elevate consciousness can then become more
important than consciousness itself.
The symbol
can replace the reality it was meant to represent.
The ritual
can replace inner transformation.
The
institution can replace spiritual seeking.
And the
believer can become more concerned with defending his conception of God than
with examining his own conduct.
This is
why I believe beliefs about God and forms of worship should, as far as
possible, remain personal matters; no organizational form of this should be
accepted at all.
A person may
believe in God. Another may not. One may pray. Another may meditate. One may
approach the Supreme through devotion. Another may approach through inquiry.
If morality
ultimately depends upon the development of consciousness, then the external
form of belief is secondary to the transformation it produces within the
individual.
From
imposed morality to natural morality
Perhaps
morality can therefore be understood as a progression.
At the
lowest level, instinct governs behavior.
At the next
level, social order and group behavior govern it.
At the human
level, rules, laws, religion, philosophy, and reason begin to regulate conduct.
But beyond
these, there may be a state in which moral conduct becomes increasingly
natural.
The
individual no longer requires constant external supervision.
He does not
need to be threatened with punishment before refraining from cruelty.
He does not need
the promise of reward to act honestly.
He does not
need to calculate whether compassion will benefit him.
His conduct
arises from what he has become.
This is
perhaps the most important distinction between morality imposed from outside
and morality arising from within.
External
morality can regulate behavior.
Only inner
development can transform the person who behaves.
That is why
I see morality not primarily as a collection of commandments, but as a
consequence of developing consciousness.
The more
clearly consciousness manifests, the greater the possibility of awareness,
discrimination, empathy, restraint, and freedom from unconscious impulses.
At the
highest level, morality may no longer appear as morality at all.
It becomes
simply the natural conduct of a sufficiently awakened human being.
In that
sense, the ultimate purpose of spiritual development may not be to make a
person obedient to a moral code.
It may be to
make such a code progressively less necessary.
If so,
morality is not something imposed on consciousness from outside; it emerges as
consciousness becomes more fully manifest.
✍️ Raghvendra Khare
Appendix:
Moral Education—From Rules to Understanding
The
discussion above raises a practical question: if morality is related to the
development of consciousness, how can that development be encouraged in
ordinary human life? One important area is education.
The Need
for Moral Education
If morality
is related to the development of consciousness, moral education has an
important place in childhood and adolescence.
Children
cannot be expected to arrive at mature moral understanding entirely on their
own. They are still developing the ability to understand consequences, control
impulses, consider others' feelings, and distinguish immediate desire from what
ought to be done. Education can therefore provide the initial framework within
which moral awareness develops.
But moral
education should not be reduced to teaching a list of virtues or asking
children to memorize moral commandments. A child may learn to repeat that
honesty is good and stealing is wrong without developing a genuine
understanding of why honesty matters.
A more
useful approach is to help children think through moral situations.
Why is it
wrong to take something that belongs to another person? What happens when we
lie? Should we tell the truth if telling it causes us some personal loss? Is it
right to remain silent when someone else is being treated unfairly? Does the
fact that something is permitted by law necessarily make it morally right?
Questions like
these can gradually develop the ability to examine one's own conduct rather
than merely obey an external rule.
Moral
education could therefore include discussions of real-life situations, stories
and their ethical dilemmas, cooperative activities, responsibility toward
others, care for animals and the environment, and opportunities for students to
reflect upon the consequences of their actions. The purpose would not be to
impose a particular religious belief, but to cultivate awareness, empathy,
discrimination, self-restraint, and responsibility.
There is
also an important practical consideration.
Schools
often teach children how to solve mathematical problems, understand science,
communicate, and acquire professional skills. But a person may possess
considerable knowledge and ability and still use them dishonestly or
destructively. Knowledge increases one's capacity to act; it does not
necessarily determine how that capacity will be used.
Moral
education therefore has a different purpose. It should help a person develop
the inner capacity to examine how and why he acts, not merely
what he can do.
Teachers and
parents also have a role that textbooks cannot replace. Children observe
conduct more readily than they absorb instruction. If adults demand honesty
from children while behaving dishonestly themselves, the contradiction may
teach more effectively than any moral lesson.
Thus, moral
education should operate at two levels: through explicit reflection and through
the example provided by the surrounding environment.
Yet its
ultimate purpose should not be to make children permanently dependent upon
rules and supervision. Rules are necessary in the early stages because
self-regulation is still developing. Ideally, however, education should
gradually transform externally imposed discipline into internal understanding.
In this
sense, moral education is not opposed to the development of consciousness; it
can be one of the means through which that development takes place.
The
objective is not to produce a person who behaves well only because someone is
watching.
It is to
help produce a person who gradually understands why he should behave
well—and eventually behaves accordingly even when no one is watching.
The purpose
of moral education, therefore, should not be to produce a person who behaves
well merely because someone is watching. It should help a person gradually
understand why he should behave well, until moral conduct becomes increasingly
natural and self-directed. In that sense, education can support the development
of consciousness, while the ultimate aim remains the same: to move from
morality imposed from outside to morality arising from within.
Why Non-Dual
(Advaita) Philosophy Should Be a Part of Education
Non-dual (Advaita) philosophy
should be made an essential part of education because it grounds morality not
in external rules or fear, but in a deep sense of oneness.
Advaita connects morality
primarily to the understanding that all living beings are different forms of
the same Self (Ātman/Brahman). Therefore, causing suffering to another is, in
reality, causing suffering to one’s own Self. When this understanding becomes
deep within a person, non-violence, compassion, and generosity cease to be
imposed rules — they become spontaneous and natural behavior. The need for
external control or the fear of punishment gradually diminishes.
In a jīvanmukta (a person of
realization), moral conduct is no longer experienced as “duty” or “action.” It
becomes his natural state. He does not follow rules because someone has
commanded him to do so; the rules have become an inseparable part of his very
nature.
If education includes this
aspect of Advaita philosophy, children can develop the understanding that
another’s suffering is not separate from their own, rather than merely
memorizing moral rules. This opens the way for morality to shift from external
pressure to inner understanding and spontaneous conduct—which should be the
true purpose of moral education.
--✍️ Raghvendra Khare
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